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R. v. Henry: Self-Incrimination and 
Self-Reflection in the 
Supreme Court 
Mr. Justice Gary Trotter* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s work in 2005 saw few ground-breaking 
pronouncements in criminal law. Most of the Court’s decisions involved 
the application of settled law, without the application of the Charter.1 A 
notable exception was the Court’s decision in R. v. Henry,2 in which the 
Court took the opportunity to look back on 20 years of its own 
jurisprudence interpreting the protection against self-incrimination in 
section 13 of the Charter. In the process, it took the “rare” step of 
reconsidering a number of its previous decisions in the area. The result 
is a very different right against self-incrimination, one that is unwed to 
any single theoretical approach to the right.  
More profoundly, the Court in Henry signals a more flexible 
approach to the precedential value of obiter dicta remarks in its own 
decisions. In the British Columbia Court of Appeal,3 two judges 
expressed concern about certain views expressed in obiter dicta by 
Arbour J.’s majority reasons in R. v. Noël.4 The Supreme Court in Henry 
points in a new direction as to how obiter remarks should be approached 
by the lower courts.  
                                                                                                            
*
 The Honourable Mr. Justice Gary Trotter is a Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice, 
Toronto Region. 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. See Ian R. Smith and Gary T. Trotter, 
“Developments in Criminal Law: The 2004-2005 Term” (2005) 30 S.C.L.R. (2d) 207, at 207. 
2 [2005] S.C.J. No. 76, 202 C.C.C. (3d) 449.  
3 [2003] B.C.J. No. 2068, 179 C.C.C. (3d) 207 (C.A.). 
4 [2002] S.C.J. No. 68, 5 C.R. (6th) 1.  
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II. PROTECTION AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: 
SEARCHING FOR A PRINCIPLE 
Protection against self-incrimination is found in section 13 of the 
Charter, which provides: 
 13. A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to 
have any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate that 
witness in any other proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury 
or for the giving of contradictory evidence. (emphasis added) 
Compared to some sections of the Charter, section 13 is drafted 
somewhat awkwardly, particularly in terms of the use of tense. Perhaps 
this is unavoidable because the section attempts to regulate the 
relationship between two separate events — the impact of testimony 
given at one proceeding being used at a subsequent proceeding. 
The availability of other legal rights in the Charter is conditioned by 
qualifiers such as “everyone”,5 “on arrest or detention”,6 a person 
“charged with an offence”.7 Section 13 is unique in that it purports to 
provide protection to “a witness”. However, it will be apparent from the 
discussion below that the protection is now only afforded to an accused 
person who was previously a non-accused witness who was compelled 
to testify in other proceedings.8 
Section 13 has proven difficult to interpret because of its 
relationship with other Charter rights, such as sections 7 (fundamental 
justice), 11(c) (the right not to be compelled to be a witness against 
oneself) and 11(d) (the presumption of innocence). Moreover, section 
13 was created against a rich history of a common law privilege against 
self-incrimination, and the statutory response to that privilege in section 
5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.9 In light of all of these considerations, 
it is not surprising that section 13 has presented challenges for the 
courts.  
                                                                                                            
5 For example, see s. 7 (fundamental justice), s. 8 (unreasonable search or seizure), s. 9 
(arbitrary detention) and s. 12 (cruel and unusual treatment or punishment). 
6 See s. 10(a), (b), (c).  
7 See s. 11(a) to (i). 
8 There are various ways that a person may be compelled to participate in a criminal trial. 
See Part XXII (Procuring Attendance) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. However, these 
formal aspects of testimonial compulsion appear to play no role in this part of the law. 
9 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. See David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 4th 
ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005), Chapter 8 — Self-Incrimination.  
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1. R. v. Dubois 
The seminal case on section 13 of the Charter is R. v. Dubois.10 
Dubois was charged with second degree murder. At his first trial, he 
testified in his own defence. He admitted the actus reus of the offence, 
but asserted that he was justified in killing the victim on the basis of 
self-defence. Dubois was convicted. He successfully appealed to the 
Court of Appeal and a new trial was ordered. At Dubois’ second trial, as 
part of its case in chief, the Crown filed approximately 60 pages of the 
accused’s testimony from his first trial. Dubois did not testify at his 
second trial and was convicted. His appeal to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal was dismissed.11 
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the accused’s 
appeal. The differences between the majority and minority judgments 
reflect two different approaches to section 13. Writing for the majority, 
Lamer J. (as he then was) (Dickson C.J., Estey, Chouinard, Wilson and 
LeDain JJ., concurring) held that section 13 of the Charter must be 
viewed in light of section 11(c) and 11(d) of the Charter. Justice Lamer 
held that the protection in section 13, in conjunction with section 11(c) 
and 11(d), form the basis of the “case to meet principle” whereby the 
burden is placed on the prosecution to prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt and that the accused need not be called upon to answer 
until a case has been made out against him.12 As Lamer J. held: 
Hence, the purpose of s. 13, when the section is viewed in the context 
of s. 11(c) and (d), is to protect individuals from being indirectly 
compelled to incriminate themselves, to ensure that the Crown will not 
be able to do indirectly that which s. 11(c) prohibits. It guarantees the 
right not to have a person’s previous testimony used to incriminate 
him or her in other proceedings.13  
A number of conclusions follow from this conceptualization of 
section 13 of the Charter. First, the protection does not arise at the point 
in time when the person gives the testimony in question (i.e., at a prior 
                                                                                                            
10 [1985] S.C.J. No. 69, 22 C.C.C. (3d) 513. 
11 [1984] A.J. No. 820, 11 C.C.C. (3d) 453 (C.A.).  
12 Supra, note 10, at 531. The “case to meet” principle appears to have stemmed from the 
writings of Professor Ed Ratushny. For example, see Ed Ratushny, Self-incrimination in the 
Canadian Criminal Process (Toronto: Carswell, 1979). In R. v. P. (M.B.), [1994] S.C.J. No. 27, 89 
C.C.C. (3d) 289, Lamer C.J. further expanded on the “case to meet” principle in the context of a 
Crown request to amend an indictment mid-trial.  
13 Id., at 532.  
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proceeding); instead, it is triggered when an attempt is made to use the 
prior testimony to incriminate the witness at a subsequent proceeding.14 
Moreover, the Court held that the issue of whether the testimony is 
incriminatory should be evaluated at the second stage of the 
proceedings, when an attempt is made to use the evidence against an 
accused person.15 
Second, and importantly for the purposes of this paper, Lamer J. 
held that the protection in section 13 of the Charter applies whether or 
not the witness testified voluntarily or under compulsion in the previous 
proceedings: 
 Moreover, given the nature and purpose of the right, which is 
essentially protection against self-incrimination, the issue of whether 
the testimony was compulsory or voluntary at the moment it was given 
is largely irrelevant. The focus of the right is on the second 
proceedings, the time at which the previous testimony is sought to be 
used, rather than the time at which it is given.  
 For these reasons, s. 13, in my view, applies as much to testimony 
voluntarily given by an accused as to testimony given by a witness 
under compulsion.16 (emphasis added) 
Lack of compulsion in terms of the accused’s prior testimony is 
consistent with the “case to meet” approach to the right. As discussed 
below, it is not consistent with the competing approach to self-
incrimination. 
Lastly, the majority in Dubois held that a re-trial on the same 
indictment satisfied the requirement of “other proceedings” in section 
13 of the Charter. As Lamer J. held: 
 To allow the prosecution to use, as part of its case, the accused’s 
previous testimony would, in effect, allow the Crown to do indirectly 
what it is estopped from doing directly by s. 11(c), i.e., to compel the 
accused to testify. It would also permit an indirect violation of the 
right of the accused to be presumed innocent and remain silent until 
proven guilty by the prosecution, as guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the 
Charter.17 
                                                                                                            
14 Id., at 534. This was a live issue in the case because Mr. Dubois’ first trial was held 
prior to the Charter coming into force, whereas his second trial occurred after. 
15 Id., at 536-37.  
16 Id., at 534.  
17 Id., at 537-38.  
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The majority found that Dubois’ rights under section 13 of the Charter 
had been violated by the Crown’s use of his testimony at his previous 
trial. A new trial was ordered. 
In a separate opinion, McIntyre J. dissented. His decision turned on 
his conclusion that a re-trial was not an “other proceeding” within the 
meaning of section 13 of the Charter. Justice McIntyre approached 
section 13 from a very different perspective than the majority and 
interpreted the provision by comparing it with the operation of section 
5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.18 He noted that, in many ways, section 
13 of the Charter vindicates the same values protected by section 5(2), 
by encouraging truthful testimony from a person in exchange for 
protection against subsequent use against the person giving the 
testimony.19 As McIntyre J. explained: 
 There is a social interest in encouraging people to come forward 
to give evidence, not only in court but on other occasions in the 
tribunals and proceedings referred to above. That interest is not served 
where witnesses in testifying expose themselves to the danger of self-
incrimination because of such testimony. It is suggested that it was a 
recognition of this fact, together with a recognition of the inadequacy 
of the law relating to self-incrimination and the inadequacy of 
provincial powers in this respect that caused the framers of the Charter 
to include the very greatly strengthened Charter provisions relating to 
self-incrimination.20  
This conception of protection against self-incrimination as a bargain or a 
contract has been referred to as the quid pro quo approach.21 Unlike the 
“case to meet” approach, this view of self-incrimination assigns 
significance to the question of whether the accused testified voluntarily 
at the first proceeding. As the theory goes, when the accused person 
testifies of his or her own accord, there is nothing to be compensated for 
by the state. In essence, there is no bargain to be made because the 
accused has sacrificed nothing. This may be gleaned from McIntyre J.’s 
view that Dubois’ rights under section 11(c) were not violated when the 
                                                                                                            
18 Id., at 537-38. R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10. 
19 Id., at 521-22. 
20 Id., at 526-27.  
21 This expression appears to have been coined by Fish J.A. (as he then was) in R. v. Noël, 
[2001] J.Q. no 2831, 156 C.C.C. (3d) 56 (C.A.), affd [2002] S.C.J. No. 68, 168 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 
discussed below. 
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Crown adduced his prior testimony as part of its case in chief because 
Dubois testified voluntarily at his first trial.22 
2. R. v. Mannion 
Dubois was applied in R. v. Mannion.23 Mannion was charged with rape 
and was convicted at the conclusion of his first trial. Mannion testified 
at his first trial. A new trial was ordered by the Court of Appeal. At his 
second trial, Mannion was cross-examined on a portion of his testimony 
from his first trial. Specifically, he was cross-examined on his previous 
testimony on the issue of the circumstances under which he left town 
before being arrested. Mannion was convicted at his second trial and his 
appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed.24 
Justice McIntyre wrote the unanimous decision of the Supreme 
Court. Accepting the majority holding in Dubois that a re-trial on the 
same indictment is an “other proceeding” for the purposes of section 13, 
McIntyre J. held that the cross-examination of the accused on his 
previous testimony was barred by the application of section 13, since the 
purpose of the cross-examination was to incriminate the accused. Justice 
McIntyre concluded: 
It is clear then that the purpose of the cross-examination, which 
revealed the inconsistent statements, was to incriminate the 
respondent. This evidence was relied upon by the Crown to establish 
the guilt of the accused. It is therefore my view that s. 13 of the 
Charter clearly applies to exclude the incriminating use of the 
evidence of these contradictory statements.25 
Justice McIntyre observed that the accused could have received the 
same protection had he invoked the protection of section 5(2) of the 
                                                                                                            
22 See supra, note 10, at 527, where McIntyre J. said:  
Section 11(c) gives the accused the right not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings 
against himself in respect of the offence. There is not in this case any compulsion involved. 
The appellant gave evidence voluntarily at his trial and on the basis of that evidence 
obtained a new trial. I do not accept the suggestion that appears in the judgment of Kerans 
J.A. that he was only technically a voluntary witness. He had a fully guaranteed right to 
silence. He was represented by counsel and he gave evidence. The provisions of s. 11(c) are 
not engaged in these circumstances where no compulsion existed. The Crown is merely 
invoking the well-settled rule of evidence that past statements made by a party are 
ordinarily receivable in evidence against him … 
23 [1986] S.C.J. No. 53, 28 C.C.C. (3d) 544. 
24 [1984] A.J. No. 987, 11 C.C.C. (3d) 503 (C.A.).  
25 Supra, note 23, at 551.  
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Canada Evidence Act. Anxious not to interpret section 13 of the Charter 
so as to provide less protection than section 5(2), McIntyre J. held that 
section 13 applied.26 
3. R. v. Kuldip 
In R. v. Kuldip27 the accused was charged with failing to stop at the 
scene of an accident, contrary to section 233(2) of the Criminal Code.28 
The accused testified at his first trial and was convicted. A new trial was 
ordered at which the accused also testified. However, at the second trial, 
the accused testified to different details concerning his attempts to report 
the accident to the police. The Crown purported to undermine the 
accused’s credibility with use of his prior testimony. The Court of 
Appeal allowed the accused’s appeal,29 holding that Mannion afforded 
no exception based on the intended use of the previous testimony 
(incrimination vs. credibility). This was based, in part, on the fact that 
the statutory protection provided in section 5(2) of the Canada Evidence 
Act30 recognized no such distinction. 
Writing for the majority, Lamer C.J. recognized the distinction 
between cross-examination intended to incriminate and cross-
examination for the purposes of attacking credibility. He concluded: 
Using a prior inconsistent statement from a former proceeding during 
cross-examination in order to impugn the credibility of an accused 
does not, in my view, incriminate that accused person. The previous 
statement is not tendered as evidence to establish the proof of its 
contents, but rather is tendered for the purpose of unveiling a 
contradiction between what the accused is saying now, and what he or 
she has said on a previous occasion.31 
In making this distinction, Lamer C.J. acknowledged that the distinction 
between incrimination and credibility might be a difficult one for a jury 
                                                                                                            
26 Id. Note that in R. v. Kuldip, [1990] S.C.J. No. 126, 1 C.R. (4th) 285, Lamer C.J. 
rejected the notion that s. 13 ought to always result in greater protection for the accused person. At 
305, he said: “The Charter aims to guarantee that individuals benefit from a minimum standard of 
fundamental rights. If Parliament chooses to grant protection over and above that which is 
enshrined in our Charter, it is always at liberty to do so.”  
27 Id. 
28 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
29 [1988] O.J. No. 40, 40 C.C.C. (3d) 11 (C.A.).  
30 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. 
31 Supra, note 26, at 302. 
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to make. However, he relied on the ability of trial judges to provide 
juries with proper limiting instructions, “reminiscent of those which are 
routinely given with respect to the use to which an accused’s criminal 
record may be put”.32 
In deciding Kuldip, the majority took a very straightforward 
approach to section 13 of the Charter and, in the process, seems to have 
subtly shifted emphasis in favour of the quid pro quo approach to the 
section 13 protection, rather than Lamer C.J.’s preferred “case to meet” 
analysis in Dubois. As Lamer C.J. said: 
 An accused has the right to remain silent during his or her trial. 
However, if an accused chooses to take the stand, that accused is 
implicitly vouching for his or her credibility. Such an accused, like 
any other witness, has therefore opened the door to having the 
trustworthiness of his/her evidence challenged. An interpretation of 
s. 13 which insulates such an accused from having previous 
inconsistent statements put to him/her on cross-examination where the 
only purpose of doing so is to challenge that accused’s credibility, 
would, in my view, “stack the deck” too highly in favour of the 
accused.33 
In a judgment simply agreeing with the Court of Appeal, Wilson J. (La 
Forest and L’Heureux-Dubé JJ. concurring) dissented. 
4. R. v. Noël 
R. v. Noël34 introduced new variables into the analysis. Noël was a non-
accused witness in a previous proceeding. As the Court’s subsequent 
decision in Henry makes clear, this becomes a critical factor. Also, 
unlike in the Court’s previous cases dealing with section 13, Noël 
invoked the protection of section 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act when 
he testified in the previous proceeding. 
Noël and his brother were alleged to have been involved in the 
killing of a nine-year-old boy. For reasons never explained, the accused 
and his brother were tried separately. The accused had made a number 
of incriminating statements to the police and then testified for the 
Crown at his brother’s trial. The Crown was permitted to cross-examine 
                                                                                                            
32 Id., at 303.  
33 Id., at 303.  
34 Supra, note 4. 
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the accused, who eventually admitted that his statements to the police 
were true and that he had been an accomplice in killing the young boy. 
Noël’s brother was acquitted. At his own trial, Noël disavowed his 
previous statements to the police and his earlier testimony at his 
brother’s trial. He was cross-examined at great length on his previous 
testimony.35 Noël was convicted. His appeal to the Quebec Court of 
Appeal was dismissed.36 
Writing for the majority, Arbour J. (McLachlin C.J., Gonthier, 
Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie and LeBel JJ.) had no difficulty in 
concluding that section 13 of the Charter had been infringed. Invoking 
an interpretation closely aligned with the purposes of section 5(2) of the 
Canada Evidence Act, Arbour J. held: 
 Section 13 reflects a long-standing form of statutory protection 
against compulsory self-incrimination in Canadian law and is best 
understood by reference to s. 5 of the Canada Evidence Act. Like the 
statutory protection, the constitutional one represents what Fish J.A. 
called a quid pro quo: when a witness is compelled to give evidence in 
a court proceeding is exposed to the risk of self-incrimination, the state 
offers protection against the subsequent use of that evidence against 
the witness in exchange for his or her full and frank testimony.37  
Further expounding on the quid pro quo, Arbour J. said: 
The witness, now accused, gave something in exchange for the 
protection. This is what makes a statement given in a judicial 
proceeding different from a statement to a person in authority, which 
is governed by rules of admissibility that are relevant to the special 
concerns related to that type of statement, and also different from all 
other out-of-court declarations and admissions.38 
Based on this conception of the protection afforded under section 5(2) 
of the Canada Evidence Act and section 13 of the Charter, the majority 
refused to recognize a distinction between evidence given under 
compulsion and evidence given voluntarily. In both circumstances, 
Arbour J. held, once a witness takes the stand, he or she is required to 
answer all questions asked. As Arbour J. said: “The bargain is engaged 
when the jeopardy arises. The protection is given in exchange for the 
                                                                                                            
35 Id., at 16.  
36 [2001] J.Q. No. 2831, 156 C.C.C. (3d) 17 (C.A.).  
37 Supra, note 4, at 25.  
38 Id., at 25.  
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answer.”39 However, Arbour J. held that the bargain only extends to uses 
of that evidence designed to “incriminate” the accused. As Arbour J. 
explained, Kuldip seemed to accept that the bargain did not extend to 
protection against the use of prior testimony designed only to challenge 
the credibility of the witness. She held that the distinction recognized in 
Kuldip fades away when the permitted use of the prior testimony and the 
impermissible use become totally intermingled and “when it is apparent 
that the prohibited use is of much greater value to the Crown and 
probably of irresistible appeal to the jury”.40 
The majority in Noël was further concerned with the nature of the 
evidence given at the prior proceeding. In Dubois, the Court had 
rejected the notion that it was necessary to determine whether or not the 
prior testimony was incriminating. However, this became crucial in 
Noël because cross-examination on prior testimony that was on its face 
incriminating, made the limited use of cross-examination for the 
purposes of testing credibility only more implausible to maintain.41 
Moreover, the majority pointed out that when the protection of section 
5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act is requested, as it was by Noël, it 
applies to any use in a subsequent proceeding, whether as part of the 
Crown’s case in-chief or for the purposes of cross-examination. Justice 
Arbour held that the trial judge should have prevented the Crown from 
engaging in any cross-examination of Noël based on this statutory 
protection alone.42 
After engaging in a probing comparative examination of section 13 
of the Charter and section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act, Arbour J. 
emerged with an important distinction, based on the characterization of 
the evidence given in the prior proceeding: 
 In the result, when the evidence given in a judicial proceeding by 
a witness who subsequently becomes an accused was incriminating at 
the time it was given, such that the witness could have been granted 
the statutory protection of s. 5 of the Canada Evidence Act, but did not 
know to ask, the focus should shift to the use that the Crown proposes 
to make of that evidence at the subsequent trial of the accused. 
Clearly, as in Dubois, supra, the Crown is precluded from introducing 
it as part of its case in chief. Whether the Crown can confront the 
                                                                                                            
39 Id., at 26.  
40 Id., at 27.  
41 Id., at 27. See also R. v. B. (W.D.), [1987] S.J. No. 631, 38 C.C.C. (3d) 12 (C.A.). 
42 Id., at 29.  
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accused with his prior incriminating testimony in cross-examination, 
purportedly to test credibility, will depend on whether there is a real 
danger, despite any warning given to the jury, that the protected 
evidence may be used to incriminate the accused. This is so in part 
because of the quid pro quo. There should be no risk attached to being 
compelled to give incriminating evidence, save to answer to perjury or 
similar charges. 
 If the prior testimony of the accused was innocuous at the time it 
was given, it is unlikely that it will serve to incriminate him when it is 
subsequently used to challenge his credibility. In such a case, as per 
Kuldip, supra, the cross-examination should be permitted. If the 
original evidence was not incriminating, the quid pro quo was never 
engaged, and the witness cannot ask of the state that he be prevented 
from being cross-examined as to his credibility should he assert 
matters differently in a subsequent proceeding, even if the ultimate 
effect of that subsequent cross-examination may be adverse to his 
interest. This is consistent with the language of s. 13 which grants to 
every witness the right not to have any “incriminating evidence so 
given used to incriminate that witness in any other proceedings. 
(italics added; underlining in the original)43 
The majority easily found that there was a real danger that the jury 
would use Noël’s prior incriminating testimony for incriminatory 
purposes at his own trial. Justice Arbour was also confident that no jury 
instruction, however skillful, could eliminate this danger.44 
It is clear that the most important distinction made by Arbour J. in 
Noël was the difference between an accused who had previously 
testified voluntarily at his or her own previous trial, and an accused who 
was previously compelled to be a witness at someone else’s trial. 
However, there are a few portions of her judgment where this distinction 
is blurred. In particular, Arbour J. said: 
It then becomes apparent that in keeping with the quid pro quo which 
lies at the heart of s. 13, the state should not be permitted to introduce 
as part of its case an incriminating statement made by the accused in 
another proceeding, even if that “other proceeding” was his previous 
trial for the same offence (see Dubois, supra); nor should the state be 
permitted to introduce, in cross-examination, for the purpose of 
                                                                                                            
43 Id., at 33.  
44 Id., at 36. 
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“incriminating” the accused, an innocuous statement that the accused 
made while a witness in another proceeding.45 
In a lengthy dissent, L’Heureux-Dubé J. held that the cross-
examination of Noël was proper and based on the correct interpretation 
of Kuldip. She accused the majority of reversing important aspects of 
Kuldip, including the holding that cross-examination on credibility is no 
longer permitted under both section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act and 
section 13 of the Charter.46 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé expressed great 
faith in the ability of jurors to carry out the sometimes difficult and 
subtle tasks they are asked to undertake. Indeed, she held that, in the 
absence of evidence suggesting otherwise, the long-standing faith of the 
courts in the abilities of jurors should be preserved. She held that 
“evidence that the jury as an institution is fundamentally incapable of 
properly using this evidence is needed before such a sweeping change 
should be made.”47 Moreover, L’Heureux-Dubé J. suggested that Arbour 
J.’s conception of the quid pro quo embodied in section 5 of the Canada 
Evidence Act and section 13 of the Charter was a significant and 
unwarranted distortion, asserting that: “With respect, no principled 
system of justice, and indeed no criminal system concerned with 
ascertaining the truth, would ever agree to enter into such an 
arrangement.”48 
Noël was applied by the Court in R. v. Allen.49 However, there was 
no real discussion of section 13 in that case. 
5. Conclusion: Confusion 
Twenty years of experience with section 13 of the Charter has given rise 
to inconsistency and dubious distinctions.50 It is no longer clear what 
underlying principle anchors section 13. Since Mannion, the Court has 
struggled with the distinction between use of prior testimony for 
incrimination as opposed to credibility. Recognizing its problematic 
                                                                                                            
45 Id., at para. 25. See also paras. 4, 54 and 59. 
46 Id., at 63.  
47 Id., at 48. In making this assertion, L’Heureux-Dubé J. relied very heavily on the 
judgment of Dickson C.J. in R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670.  
48 Id., at 61.  
49 [2003] S.C.J. No. 16, 172 C.C.C. (3d) 449.  
50 See Hamish Stewart & Erica Bussey, “The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Too 
Strong, Too Weak or Both?” (2005) 9 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 369. 
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nature, the Noël Court sought to provide greater protection by creating 
what turns out to be an unworkable standard. Moreover, because of 
obiter dicta remarks in Noël, the fundamental question of whether 
section 13 applies to a re-trial situation is left up in the air.51 
III. R. V. HENRY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPULSION 
In addition to confusion, some courts have bristled against the 
implications of Noël, especially the prospect of an accused person 
testifying in one way at his or her first trial, and then giving completely 
contradictory evidence at a re-trial, with no consequences other than a 
possible prosecution for perjury or for giving contradictory evidence. 
This set the stage for the issue to return once again to the Supreme Court 
of Canada in R. v. Henry.  
Henry and Riley were charged with first degree murder. Both 
testified at what turned out to be their first trials. Both relied upon the 
defence of intoxication. They were convicted, but their convictions were 
overturned on appeal. At the re-trial, both accused testified again, but 
Henry claimed to have been so intoxicated that he had virtually no 
memory of the events. Riley resiled from the defence of intoxication, 
and pointed the finger at Henry as being responsible for the victim’s 
death. The Crown was permitted to cross-examine both accused on their 
prior testimony, leading to a conviction of both. Again, they appealed 
their convictions, relying on R. v. Noël to support their position that 
cross-examination was improper in the circumstances. 
Their appeals were dismissed by a majority of the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal.52 Justices Southin and Newbury held that there were 
various passages in the opinion of Arbour J. that suggested that the law 
articulated in that case applied to the situation of an accused who 
testified at a re-trial inconsistent with his or her evidence at the first 
trial.53 Justice Southin said that, if the obiter in Noël were authoritative, 
it would lead to the creation of a new constitutionally protected right: 
“the right to swear falsely in one’s own defence or, to put it another 
way, a right to give the jury one story at one’s first trial and if, from 
                                                                                                            
51 See Hamish Stewart, “Henry in the Supreme Court of Canada: Re-orienting the s. 13 
Right Against Self-Incrimination” (2005) 34 C.R. (6th) 112.  
52 [2003] B.C.J. No. 2068, 179 C.C.C. (3d) 307 (C.A.). 
53 Supra, note 4, at para. 25.  
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some judicial misstep, one gets a new trial, to abandon the story which 
the first jury had rejected and try something different on the second 
jury.”54  
Writing for the entire Court, Binnie J. engaged in a thorough review 
of the Court’s section 13 jurisprudence, from Dubois to Noël. In artful 
understatement, he concluded: 
Clearly there has not been consistent adherence to the underlying 
purpose of s. 13, namely “to protect individuals from being directly 
compelled to incriminate themselves.”55 
Along the way to reaching this conclusion, he observed that, in Dubois, 
the Court asserted that the protection was not predicated on whether the 
accused testified voluntarily or under compulsion in the prior 
proceeding.56 The Mannion Court was silent on the matter. In Kuldip, 
the Court implicitly recognized the importance of compulsion. In his 
review of the Court’s previous decisions, Binnie J. was also keenly 
aware of the artificiality of jurors and judges keeping separate the 
incriminating and credibility-related value of prior testimony.57  
Justice Binnie considered the Noël Court’s emphasis on the 
presence of compulsion as a pre-condition to the operation of section 13 
protection. As Binnie J. held: 
It must be recognized that a witness who was also the accused at the 
first trial is at both trials a voluntary rather than a compelled witness, 
and therefore does not offer the same quid pro quo. (The notion that an 
accused who volunteers testimony can simultaneously object to 
answering questions whose answers may tend to incriminate him or 
her is a difficult concept. The whole point of volunteering testimony is 
to respond to the prosecution’s case. Even answer to his or her own 
counsel’s questions may tend to incriminate).58  
It is clear that the Henry Court was attracted to the compulsion/ 
voluntary dichotomy as a triggering mechanism for section 13. 
However, there were two obstacles to making this the unifying concept 
                                                                                                            
54 Supra, note 52, at 350-51. Justice Southin also said (at 351): “In that context, I use the 
word ‘right’ to mean that which one can do with impunity or with so little consequence as makes no 
matter. A possible charge under s. 136 of the Criminal Code is of trivial consequence to a man 
charged with first degree murder.”  
55 Supra, note 2, at 467 (emphasis in the original). 
56 Id., at 463.  
57 Id., at 465-66. 
58 Id., at 465.  
(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) Self-Incrimination and Self-Reflection 423 
of section 13 protection. First, the Court’s own cases tended to lean in 
the opposite direction. Second, and as observed by Southin and 
Newbury JJ.A. in the British Columbia Court of Appeal, obiter dicta in 
the majority reasons in Noël cast doubt on the centrality of compulsion. 
However, both obstacles were overcome. 
1. Precedent 
As for precedent, the focus on voluntariness seemed quite sensible given 
the Court’s gravitation to the quid pro quo theory of section 13 of the 
Charter. However, over the years, various members of the Court had 
expressed the view that it did not matter. After Noël, it clearly did, 
although Binnie J. wished to make this change without disturbing the 
holding in Dubois that prohibited the Crown from using prior, non-
compelled testimony as part of its case in chief. 
The Court refused to reconsider Dubois, holding that, when a new 
trial is ordered, an accused person has the choice not to testify at all. As 
Binnie J. explained:  
Thus, to allow the Crown simply to file the testimony of the accused 
given at the prior trial (now overturned) would permit the Crown 
indirectly to compel the accused to testify at the retrial where s. 11(c) 
of the Charter would not permit such compelled self-incrimination 
directly. 
Dubois, to repeat, was an attempt to compel testimony. The result was 
correct and we should decline the invitation to revisit it.59  
Effectively reverting to the “case to meet” principle, Binnie J. found that 
such a procedure would be tantamount to a section 11(c) violation.60  
The Court took a different view of Mannion. Justice Binnie 
observed that, in that case, there was no attempt to compel testimony as 
there was in Dubois. Instead, the accused testified voluntarily at the 
prior proceeding and decided to testify again on the re-trial. Justice 
Binnie found the quid pro quo missing from the equation, thereby 
undermining the purposes of the application of section 13 of the Charter. 
Reflecting on the experience of the Court since Dubois and Mannion 
were decided, Binnie J. observed that failing to keep the underlying 
                                                                                                            
59 Id., at 467. 
60 Given that the factual scenario in Dubois does not fit neatly into the wording of s. 13 of 
the Charter, this type of violation is probably classified under s. 7. 
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purpose of section 13 of the Charter clearly in sight has created 
unworkable distinctions in the law. Accordingly, Binnie J. concluded 
that: 
 In my respectful view, notwithstanding the strong Court that 
decided Mannion and the cases that followed it, we should hold that s. 
13 is not available to an accused who chooses to testify at his or her 
retrial on the same indictment.61 
The Court decided that there were compelling reasons to justify one of 
its “rare” departures from its precedents. The prime reason offered for 
departing from Mannion was that the Court in that case failed to adhere 
to the underlying purposes of section 13 of the Charter articulated in 
Dubois. Second, Binnie J. held that, over time, the distinction drawn 
between impeachment of credibility and incrimination had proven 
unworkable. Justice Binnie essentially held that Arbour J.’s attempts in 
Noël to address this problem made matters worse.62 
Justice Binnie concluded that maintaining earlier distinctions where 
voluntariness was considered irrelevant led to unfairness to persons who 
were compelled to testify in previous proceedings because they were 
placed on the same footing as those who testified voluntarily. He 
concluded: 
Accused persons who testify at their first trial and then volunteer 
inconsistent testimony at the retrial on the same charge are in no need 
of protection “from being indirectly compelled to incriminate 
themselves” in any relevant sense of the word, and s. 13 protection 
should not be available to them.63 
Of course, this sweeping passage was sufficient to do away with 
Mannion and Kuldip, especially since Kuldip was an extension of the 
Court’s holding in Mannion. Consequently, the Court also eradicated 
the distinction between credibility and incrimination such that, “[i]f the 
contradiction reasonably gives rise to an inference of guilt, s. 13 of the 
Charter does not preclude the trier of fact from drawing the common 
sense inference.”64 
                                                                                                            
61 Id., at 468. Of course, this broad statement is subject to the significant qualification 
provided by upholding Dubois.  
62 Id., at 469-70. 
63 Id., at 470-71.  
64 Id., at 471.  
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While the Court’s decision in Noël was largely consumed with the 
problem of improper use of prior testimony for incriminatory purposes, 
a distinction eradicated after Henry, the Henry Court left Noël intact as 
it applied to the factual scenario in that case. This was largely based on 
the analysis of section 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act. However, 
Binnie J. went further and held that when testimony is truly compelled, 
as it was in Noël, under section 13 as under section 5(2), it must be 
treated as inadmissible for any purpose.65 In short, where an accused 
testifies at his or her own prior trial, the previous testimony can be used 
in cross-examination for any purpose at the re-trial. When the accused 
testifies as a witness at someone else’s trial, the testimony may not be 
used for any purpose. Everything now turns on the issue of 
voluntariness. 
2. Obiter Dicta 
To reach this result, it was also necessary for the Court to address the 
obiter comments of Arbour J. in Noël. As noted above, in parts of her 
judgment, Arbour J. leaves the impression that the protection afforded to 
someone in Mr. Noël’s circumstances also applies to a person who 
testifies at his or her own first trial, and then again at a re-trial.  
Justice Binnie engaged in an interesting analysis of distinguishing 
between the binding ratio decidendi of a judgment and that properly 
considered to be merely non-binding obiter. This task is complicated, 
especially given the realities of the Court’s institutional role that, 
according to section 40 of the Supreme Court Act,66 is focused more on 
questions of public importance. The Court’s work is more concerned 
with principle, rather than error correction.67 The demarcation line 
between binding and non-binding aspects of Supreme Court judgments 
is less tidy in the constitutional realm, where the Court attempts to 
develop analytical frameworks that, while not strictly essential for the 
disposition of a case, are intended to be binding on lower courts.68 
However, Binnie J. indicated that the principle that emerged from R. v. 
                                                                                                            
65 Id., at 471-72. 
66 R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26.  
67 See Bertha Wilson, “Decision-making in the Supreme Court” (1986) 36 U.T.L.J. 227. 
68 Supra, note 2, at 473. As an example, Binnie J. refers to the s. 1 analysis in R. v. Oakes, 
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321.  
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Sellars,69 whereby lower courts are bound by considered rulings on 
points of law not strictly necessary to the conclusion, ought now to be 
“disavowed”.70  
While the lower courts are now released from the strictures of 
Sellars, it is still unclear as to what is binding and what is not. As Binnie 
J. writes: 
The weight decreases as one moves away from the dispositive ratio 
decidendi to a wider circle of analysis which is obviously intended for 
guidance and which should be accepted as authoritative. Beyond that, 
there will be commentary, examples or exposition that are intended to 
be helpful and may be found to be persuasive, but are certainly not 
“binding” in the sense that the Sellars principle in its most exaggerated 
form would have it.71 
This approach is designed to foster growth and creativity in the 
development of the common law.72 
Applied to Noël, Binnie J. refused to isolate Arbour J.’s comments 
as problematic. Instead, and in more sweeping terms, he held that, to the 
extent that statements in other cases are “inconsistent with the rationale 
of compulsion” (the “quid pro quo”), they should no longer be regarded 
as authoritative.73 Justice Binnie essentially agreed with the comments 
of members of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Henry that parts 
of the Court’s comments in Noël were plainly wrong. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF SELF-INCRIMINATION 
The Court in Henry has reconfigured the law of self-incrimination in a 
way that makes it more rational. Despite the fact that Henry has resulted 
in the constriction of section 13 protection, initial reactions to the case 
                                                                                                            
69 [1980] S.C.J. No. 9, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 527.  
70 Supra, note 2, at 473. The Court effectively disavowed the so-called Sellars principle in 
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 
S.C.J. No. 75, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 193. 
71 Id., at 475. 
72 See Don Stuart, “Annotation to Regina v. Henry” (2006) 33 C.R. (6th) 215.  
73 Supra, note 2, at 476.  
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have been positive.74 Still, the law has been developed into a very 
complicated state,75 with a couple of questions left lingering. 
1. Compulsion 
The critical distinction in Binnie J’s reasons in Henry is the voluntary 
vs. non-voluntary nature of the prior testimony. Yet, the Court does not 
elaborate on the concept of voluntariness to any great degree. The 
protection applies only when the accused testifies at a prior proceeding 
as a witness at someone else’s trial, whether or not he or she testifies 
pursuant to a subpoena. This approach is completely consistent with the 
quid pro quo approach to self-incrimination. However, it engages 
voluntariness in only the most formal sense. There may well be a 
qualitative difference between the accused who is forced to testify for 
the Crown at the trial of another, and the accused who decides (without 
a subpoena) to testify for the defence at the trial of the same person. 
Should the person in the latter situation be afforded the protection of 
section 13? Moreover, this conception of testimonial voluntariness 
simplifies the apparent “choice” of an accused person to testify at his or 
her trial. Professors Paciocco and Stuesser distinguish between 
“tactical” and legal compulsion.76 As the authors posit, “accused persons 
may come to feel that they have no choice but to testify because of the 
strength of the evidence against them.”77 Yet, Henry only recognizes 
legal compulsion, despite how difficult the choice faced by an accused 
person may be.78 
                                                                                                            
74 See Stewart, supra, note 51, at 112 and Stuart, supra, note 72. 
75 It was necessary for Professor Stewart to include an Appendix (Effect of Henry on 
Previous Decisions) to his article to properly explain the law. 
76 David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 4th ed. (Toronto: Irwin, 
2005), at 283-84.  
77 Id., at 283. Moreover, in the case of multiple accused trials, if one accused decides to 
testify, and places the blame on the other(s), an accused may be faced with an agonizing choice as 
to whether to testify.  
78 Paciocco & Stuesser, id., point to R. v. Darrach, [2000] S.C.J. No. 46, 148 C.C.C. (3d) 
97 as an example of the Court restricting compulsion for the purposes of s. 7 or 11(c) to legal 
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2. Credibility and the Role of the Jury 
Justice Binnie’s eradication of the Kuldip/Mannion distinction between 
cross-examination for the purposes of incrimination and cross-
examination going to credibility is welcome. It was a much-criticized 
aspect of the Court’s section 13 jurisprudence.79 However, the 
implications of this aspect of Henry may be more far-reaching. The 
Court’s decision to allow multiple uses of prior testimony is rooted in its 
adherence to the quid pro quo theory of self-incrimination. If there is no 
compulsion, then there is no reason to subject subsequent use to 
credibility alone. Of course, this raises the question of why the Court did 
not also accept the invitation to reconsider its holding in Dubois. Dubois 
does not fit nicely into the post-Henry world of section 13.80 Professor 
Hamish Stewart argues that, given the focus on the compelled nature of 
the prior testimony, “it is hard to understand how Dubois can remain 
good law.”81 This is because it is not really a section 13 case. As Binnie 
J. points out, filing the testimony from a previous trial as part of the 
Crown’s case in-chief effectively permits compelled testimony, contrary 
to section 11(c) of the Charter. It is not section 13 that prohibits this use 
of prior testimony. It is a creative interpretation of section 11(c) that 
achieves this result.  
Beyond the theoretical reasons for eradicating the distinction 
between different uses of prior testimony, there was another, very 
practical reason that motivated the Court in Henry. One of the accepted 
“truths” of Canadian criminal law is the ability of jurors to follow subtle 
instructions as to permissible and impermissible uses of certain types of 
evidence. The use of an accused person’s criminal record is probably the 
most commonly cited example.82 Indeed, this example was relied upon 
by L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Noël to argue against the majority’s attempt to 
tighten up the dubious distinction drawn by the majority in Kuldip. Is 
                                                                                                            
79 See M. Naeem Rauf, “Section 13 of the Charter and the Use of an Accused’s Prior 
Testimony: A Reply to David Doherty and Ronald Delisle” (1991) 4 C.R. (4th) 42. At 47 and 48, 
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80 See Stewart & Bussey, supra, note 50, who argue that the reasoning in Dubois is 
unpersuasive because Dubois was not compelled to testify at his first trial, thereby making the 
subsequent use of the testimony as “compelled” dubious.  
81 See Stewart, supra, note 51, at 112.  
82 See R. v. Corbett, supra, note 47. 
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the Court’s new stance in Henry to be taken as recognition that we 
cannot rely on the ability of jurors to make these subtle distinctions? 
What of our dependence on jurors’ abilities to disabuse their minds of 
pre-trial publicity or the efficacy of all sorts of other limiting 
instructions, such as those related to similar fact evidence, bad character 
evidence and statements of co-accused? Our faith in the institution of 
trial by jury has long necessitated that we cling to beliefs in these 
special powers of jurors. But social scientists have long been telling us 
that our faith is misplaced.83 Is the Court in Henry starting to question its 
own faith on this issue? Given that the eradication of the distinction 
between the two uses of evidence was primarily driven by theoretical 
concerns, it is probably best to be cautious in gauging the implications 
of this aspect of the Court’s decision. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s unanimous judgment in Henry is important for many reasons. 
First and foremost, for its re-orientation of the law of self-incrimination in 
section 13 of the Charter. Despite the questions that still linger after 
Henry, we are left with a more sensible account of a difficult provision of 
the Charter. As Southin J. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
recognized in Henry, we work in an era in which appellate courts order 
re-trials with great regularity.84 For the criminal justice system to maintain 
credibility in striking the fine balance between rights protection in pursuit 
of its truth-seeking goal, the decision in Noël could not stand. The 
sensible approach in Henry tends to achieve this balance a bit better, such 
that an accused person cannot now tell one story at his or her first trial, 
and then another at the re-trial, all with complete impunity. 
Henry also sheds light on the self-reflective qualities of the Supreme 
Court of Canada. It would have been easy for the Court to have declined 
the invitation to re-calibrate the law of self-incrimination, given that Noël 
had not been long decided. While striking a defensive chord at times, and 
apparently being unable to come out and plainly say “we were wrong,” 
Henry is a heartening example of a dynamic Court, responsive to 
legitimate concerns expressed about its previous decisions. 
                                                                                                            
83 For an excellent review of the social science learning on the ability of jurors to 
comprehend instructions on criminal records, see Owen M. Rees, “The Jury’s Propensity for 
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